amtrak-csx-trains-collide-in-south-carolina-injuries-reported

[John]

This video displays the forces at play in a collision between a moving locomotive and a stationary train ...

[mu26aeh]

Some more information from Jacksonville Business Journal

https://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2018/02/06/incorrect-information-from-csx-employee-led-to.html

[nscalbitz]

NBC News was reporting this evening that the train control signals were down while CSX installs PTC on that section of track, and that the Dispatcher gave the Amtrak crew clearance to proceed.  Train speed was reported as 51 mph.

So, besides the irony of PTC actually contributing to the cause of this wreck, there are still remaining questions as to why the CSX crew left the switch set for the siding when leaving the train for the night,  and why the Dispatcher did not know that or failed to act on the knowledge.  The Amtrak crew seems to be not responsible for the tragedy (but still dead).

I'm actually appalled at the vitriole and condescension shown in some remarks here. That a tragedy has occurred resulting in deaths and injury is bad enough. That it was avoidable is reprehensible.

What happened to operating safety manual systems when automation is taken out?

"besides the irony of PTC actually contributing to the cause of this wreck...". No it didn't. A potential solution (for avoidnace of harm/ control loss) is not a cause.
Were SOPs exceeded/ non-compliance causes? Was whoever misaligned switches at fault? What securing confirmation was not complied with?

*faKE news* "-injuries-reported" is a bit of an understatement.

As an aside, I'd read elsewhere that 'Amtrak' crew was just a euphemism for actually the operating roads staff in passenger service; or is that varied by 'contract area'?
davew

**Edit for clarity and comment.

[draskouasshat]

Out sounds to me line csx doesn't know how to do a proper and safe signal cutover or they are completely bullshitting the media.
I want to know why they had to completely shut down the signal system to "install ptc".
Maybe they should come to my railroad and see how it's done.

[jagged ben]

What happened here sounds very similar, with a signaling system offline for maintenance/upgrade/PTC installation, a train operating system in place that no one is familiar with and does not know the proper communication, a switch which was somehow missed by the CSX crew OR a dispatcher lost track of, and incorrect information given to the Amtrak crew, who may have not followed proper procedure for a dark signal (or were instructed to ignore it because the maintenance issue was known and supposedly had been accounted for). I would also assume, given how close the CSX engine was to the switch and the curve to the track, that even at restricted speed, unless the signal was literally right there at the siding, there still would have been a collision had the crew done the stop and proceed routine, since the dispatcher clearly had no knowledge of the misaligned switch.

That seems doubftul.   There were a few hundred feet from the switch to the collision point and also there isn't actually a curve that hid their view, as far as I can tell.  From what we know the engineer seemingly hit the brake as soon as he saw the switch misaligned.   I suppose you may be right that there might still have been a collision at restricted speed, but it most likely wouldn't have been fatal.  Then again, restricted speed is by definition slow enough to stop for anything you can't see.

[Maletrain]

I'm actually appalled at the vitriole and condescension shown in some remarks here. ..."besides the irony of PTC actually contributing to the cause of this wreck...". No it didn't. A potential solution (for avoidnace of harm/ control loss) is not a cause.

I made that comment the way I did because I had just watched the umpteenth broadcast news segment that touted PTC as the solution to Amtrak's continuing series of fatal accidents and blamed the railroads for not having already installed it.  Maybe it is the ultimate solution, but then they just blamed putting it in place for these deaths (and maybe that isn't correct either).

Sorry if that "appalled" you.

What appalls me is that this does seem to have been another screw-up that has killed people who depend on railroads to do what is necessary to make them safe for public transportation.  I can't undertand how a train crew can leave their train for the night without returning a mainline switch to its normal position.  And I can't understand a dispatcher telling a passenger train to proceed through the area at-speed without verification that the route is clear.

[up1950s]

1 Does anybody know how many miles of no signals working there were ?

2 How deep into that leg was the tragedy ?

3 How many blind turns they would have taken to clear the leg ?

4 Why an engineer and conductor would travel at speed under those conditions ?

[mu26aeh]

Some of the numbers from the link I posted.  Answers 2 of your questions somewhat....

From the train’s last stop, the maximum speed reached 57 mph. The track speed, under signal suspension rules, is 59 mph. About 7 seconds before the end of the recording, the train’s horn was activated for three seconds. Speed was 56 mph.

The distance from the switch to the site of the crash was 659 feet.

Seven seconds before the crash, the Amtrak train sounded its horn for three seconds, according to the train's event data recorder.

Five seconds before the crash, the Amtrak train started braking.

Three seconds before the crash, the Amtrak engineer hit the mushroom-shaped emergency brake, slowing the train down to 50 mph.

The head-to-head impact pushed the parked CSX train back 15 feet.

[jagged ben]

Some of the numbers from the link I posted.  Answers 2 of your questions somewhat....

From the train’s last stop, the maximum speed reached 57 mph. The track speed, under signal suspension rules, is 59 mph. About 7 seconds before the end of the recording, the train’s horn was activated for three seconds. Speed was 56 mph.

The distance from the switch to the site of the crash was 659 feet.

Seven seconds before the crash, the Amtrak train sounded its horn for three seconds, according to the train's event data recorder.

Five seconds before the crash, the Amtrak train started braking.

Three seconds before the crash, the Amtrak engineer hit the mushroom-shaped emergency brake, slowing the train down to 50 mph.

The head-to-head impact pushed the parked CSX train back 15 feet.

56 mph is 82ft per second.  (50mph is 73ft per second.)  Thus 8-9 seconds from the switch to the impact.  1-2 second reaction time between unexpectedly taking the switch and blowing the horn, evidently.  Seems like a somewhat poor reaction time to hit the e-brake, but hard to put oneself in those shoes.  Having been in a couple types of vehicle crashes, my recollection is that it is not evident that it's too late until it's too late.

[ljudice]

Although mistakes were made - it sounds like the underlying issue was situational awareness on the part of the dispatcher and CSX crew, which points probably to overstretching these employees and lack of supervision.

I predict CSX will get slammed in NTSB report...

[learmoia]

All speculation based on data within this thread..

So if he's traveling 82ft per second Events start 7 seconds before the crash..

And there is 659ft between the switch and the collision ..

The Horn starts at 574ft. from the collision (85ft after passing the switch)

Brake at 410ft from the collision (249ft (3 seconds) after passing the switch.)

E Brake at 249ft (3 seconds) before the crash - 410ft after passing the switch.

1:  I thought the horn was for the grade crossing 1500ft back from the switch.  But it may not have been..
2:  Brake 3 seconds after the switch makes sense but seems like bit of a delayed reaction... (If there was a target on the switch, it should have noticed 1-2 seconds earlier since there is tangent track before the switch.  So brake should have been before the horn in the time line.
3: Ebrake timing makes sence since your view of the train is blocked by the bridge until the last seconds..
.. I'm not an engineer, but I'm guessing you don't want to hit the ebrake on a 60MPH Train going through a 25mph switch..   

So...
57MPH at 2am - Rural area no crossings coming up..
Notice the Switch
6
Controlled Brake..
5
Please be clear
4
Please be clear
3
CRAP!.. Ebrake..
2
1
.....

This might help put things in to perspective as well.
https://www.google.com/maps/@33.9108895,-81.0656665,31a,35y,216.28h,79.2t/data=!3m1!1e3

View in Web browser.. should come up in 3d ground level near engineers view..  (Google Earth would give a better view)

~Ian

[Lenny53]

Although mistakes were made - it sounds like the underlying issue was situational awareness on the part of the dispatcher and CSX crew, which points probably to overstretching these employees and lack of supervision.

I predict CSX will get slammed in NTSB report...

From mu26aeh link "After the CSX conductor on site told a dispatcher that the switch was properly aligned, the dispatcher gave the go-ahead for the Amtrak train".  I think that should clear the dispatcher. 

[wazzou]

"After the CSX conductor on site told a dispatcher that the switch was properly aligned, the dispatcher gave the go-ahead for the Amtrak train". 

Well, I doubt that Conductor has had a good nights sleep then.

[dandopinski]

found the CSX rule :

Rule 266. Suspension of Signal System

Block Signals and signal rules may be temporarily remove from service by special instructions, dispatcher message or form EC-1

An alternate method of operation must be established and all trains affected notified.

Signals may only be removed from service when authorized by the proper authority, under the following conditions:

1. When a signal system is rednered inoperative by storm or flood,

2. When the signal system is disrupted for other cause and prompt restoration cannot be effected, or

3. When construction work necessitate the signals' temporary removal from service.

Unless otherwise specified, trains must:

a. Approach all absolute signals prepared to stop and not pass these signals without permission of the train dispatcher

b. Approach all public grade crossings that are equipped with automatic grade-crossing warning devices prepared to stop.
   This must be done unless the warning devices are operating. Trains will procees over such crossings only when it is safe
   to do so

c. Examine switch points to ensure they are lined and secured before making facing point movement over spring switches

d. Operate switches and derails as prescribed by Rule 104-I, and

e. Stop at drawbridges and railroad crossings at grade and will be governed by rules of special instructions in effect for
   that particular location.

Rule 104-It has some specifics about Power Switches, Derails and Spring Switches. The switch and derail in this case were not
         powered, and it was also not a spring switch. It was a hand operated electric lock switch. I am mystified why this was
         not covered off in Rule 266

[draskouasshat]

That rule only offers insight into them operating while the signal system is down, which is dumb, theres so many safer ways to cut new signals over than to just shut sh!t down to supposedly install ptc.
I really hope they can show proof that they're installing ptc on this sub where this happened.