amtrak-csx-trains-collide-in-south-carolina-injuries-reported

[Ed Kapuscinski]

Honestly, there's a problem with the rule.
If you don't have positive indication that there's nothing thrown against you, you should be running at restricted speed. Period.

This isn't the 1870s.

[Jbub]

That rule only offers insight into them operating while the signal system is down, which is dumb, theres so many safer ways to cut new signals over than to just shut sh!t down to supposedly install ptc.
I really hope they can show proof that they're installing ptc on this sub where this happened.

I agree. I don't understand the logic of shutting down a safety system without implementing a secondary to install a new system. When UP upgraded the mains between evanston  wy and Ogden ut, it appeared to me that they kept the old system intact and installed everything new, cabinets, masts, heads, antennae you name it. All the new heads were turned 90 deg away from tracks until they were ready to "turn it on". That seems to me the better way to do it. I'm sure Adam has more insight to this process than my occasional observations though.

[draskouasshat]

I agree. I don't understand the logic of shutting down a safety system without implementing a secondary to install a new system. When UP upgraded the mains between evanston  wy and Ogden ut, it appeared to me that they kept the old system intact and installed everything new, cabinets, masts, heads, antennae you name it. All the new heads were turned 90 deg away from tracks until they were ready to "turn it on". That seems to me the better way to do it. I'm sure Adam has more insight to this process than my occasional observations though.

That's how your supposed to do it. Dumbass csx.

[C855B]

... I don't understand the logic of shutting down a ... system without implementing a secondary to install a new system. ...

I can tell you exactly what was said in the planning meetings, as I heard it dozens of times in my tech career: "Implementation will happen twice as fast - or better! - if we can clear the old stuff out first so it won't be in the way." Doesn't matter if it's signal/safety systems, management software or production hardware, the story and arguments are the same. The managers who buy that logic are the ones holding titles to a particular New York bridge, or waterfront property in Florida. More likely the latter in CSX's case.

Of course it never happens that way, there's always "a major glitch". Or, more accurately, several dozen of them. 

[John]

Back in my Navy days, it was drummed into us that every safety rule was written in blood, and sometimes guts !!!!

[up1950s]

As I see it so far and questions .

Q1 Was the signals out when the autorack train was backed into the siding ? Not that should have mattered .

Error 1 Switched locked onto industrial siding .

Error 2 Amtrak asked the dispatcher what's up with the signaling and a conductor overheard and told the dispatcher that the line was all clear , no mention of turnout alignment asked or given . The dispatcher told the Amtrak to go ahead .

Q2 Was that conductor from the Autorack train ?

I followed that main south , the next major yard is in Savannah Ga . There were very many grade crossings and lots of single track . So only God knows the distance of lights out in that long stretch .

Error 3 The engineer was not careful enough , or was over ridden by the conductor .

Error 4 The conductor who is in charge failed to foresee the need for extra caution and tell the engineer to go slow when nearing turnouts .

Q3 Did the Engineer and the Conductor have charts showing where the turnouts were , Mile Post info ?

Q4 When closing down on a threat , who wouldn't you drop the air first , then blow the horn , or bail out . Why use up 3/4 of the space playing wait and see ?

[draskouasshat]

Richie, none of that is how actual railroading works. Real railroaders, including the amtrak crew are supposed to know the line they're operating. It's part of their job.
This guy should know where he was at.
Instructions rule sensitive conversations, like the position of mainline switches isn't just some random conversation you have over the radio. Its part of releasing and stunting your authority to hold the main line.
Im not being an a$$, but there's allot more to real railroading. Our rulebook is written in blood for a reason. The major f()chups here will not be oblivious to your average railfan/modeler as they are deep into our operating rules. Even a thing as simple as the switch being lined reverse isn't simple once you bring in the fact that it's any electric lock sand the type of safety that adds to route abd section locking.
Im willing to bet, the final investigation will be vague in actual blame due to the rules that were broken. Class 1 FRA violations will be handed out to csx abd amtrak.

[draskouasshat]

Richie, please don't take my replies as me being a complete d!ckhead as I'm not trying to be that way. I'm just very adamant in my explanations when it comes to this kind of thing.

Drasko

[up1950s]

Richie, please don't take my replies as me being a complete d!ckhead as I'm not trying to be that way. I'm just very adamant in my explanations when it comes to this kind of thing.

Drasko

I don't and I respect your opinion and knowledge . I appreciate your willingness to share that with me/us . Given that the rules are so strict and seemingly thoroughly thought out it boggles my mind that this could and did happen over and over again . With a simple car map GPS it warns me when speeding . Why as a FAST fix hasn't this been put in place a decade ago ? It won't take control , but in almost t all cases all that was needed was a wake up call . For this I find the NTSB at fault .

[Jbub]

I don't and I respect your opinion and knowledge . I appreciate your willingness to share that with me/us . Given that the rules are so strict and seemingly thoroughly thought out it boggles my mind that this could and did happen over and over again . With a simple car map GPS it warns me when speeding . Why as a FAST fix hasn't this been put in place a decade ago ? It won't take control , but in almost t all cases all that was needed was a wake up call . For this I find the NTSB at fault .

The NTSB is not a governing body. They investigate incidents in all forms of transportation and give findings and recommendations to the governing agency i.e. FAA, FRA and NHTSA. Generally speaking though, they only take high profile cases such as the Amtrak accident in this thread and almost all aviation accidents. Hardly any when it comes to roads

[nkalanaga]

True, the NTSB has no enforcement authority, so can't really do anything except release reports.

But I agree with the GPS suggestion, and others made it after the Washington State Amtrak crash.  It wouldn't prevent a collision, but would certainly reduce the chances of an engineer missing a speed restriction, or other permanent safety issue.

[pedro]

I can’t speak to CSX (NORAC) rules, but in GCOR TWC rules there is a switch position verification that takes place between the crew (both members) and the dispatcher when releasing main track authority. (i.e. releasing a track warrant) It goes something like: “Conductor Jones, BNSF 1234 west, track warrant number xxx, reporting clear of milepost xxx, All switches are lined and locked for main line movement,” all of which the dispatcher repeats, then asks  “Is that correct?” To which the engineer says “Engineer Smith, that is correct.” I have no further knowledge of what took place out there, but I’m pretty sure this will come down to the CSX crew (and possibly the dispatcher) improperly clearing a track warrant. Stop speculating about missed signals, because there were none operating. In CTC there are no (Mainline) switch targets to see. Just the switch points. At anything above a crawl, there’s no way you could stop in time. The train was going 59 MPH because it was authorized to do so under TWC rules.

Furthermore, stay out of the Amtrak engineer’s head with the reaction time. It’s pointless. Until you’re in an emergency life/death situation you have no idea how you’ll react. I’ve had two fatal grade crossing incidents. The first one I reacted to instantly with the emergency air dump because I didn’t see it coming; the second one there was a moment of hesitation, blowing the horn, disbelief etc. because I could see it unfolding relatively slowly (intentionally) in front of me. There’s just no telling.

PTC will solve a lot of these problems. It’s a complex system that was mandated without funding. It’s going to take time.

[C855B]

...there is a switch position verification that takes place between the crew (both members) and the dispatcher when releasing main track authority. (i.e. releasing a track warrant) It goes something like: “Conductor Jones, BNSF 1234 west, track warrant number xxx, reporting clear of milepost xxx, All switches are lined and locked for main line movement,” all of which the dispatcher repeats, then asks  “Is that correct?” To which the engineer says “Engineer Smith, that is correct.” ...

The track warrant "script", which I have heard countless times in my life in and out of the industry, on wire and radio, has bothered me from the beginning as pointless rote. After the first couple of dozen times a crewman has "sung" the recitative, the ceremonial exchange is ingrained, and the "...all switches lined and locked..." statement is mindless patter. You can just tell in the tone of the crewman's voice it's a "let's get this over with", the faster the better.

IOW, the exchange has very high risk of not reflecting reality because it's, again, a required memorized script executed hundreds of times whose importance has been lost. Sort of like a Hail Mary.

How to fix this? Well, for starters there's no fixing it, not the way the RRs resist procedural change. But if I were king and were to dictate a change, the warrant release conversation exchange would be more of an interview process where the dispatcher would ask directly whether there any switches thrown, and if so, where. Forcing the crewman to recall or even read from a list which switches were moved would break the rote memorization rhythm and make them think, and the DS would record which switches were thrown and their current status on his own log, instead of defaulting to "everything is hunky-dory unless otherwise noted".

[peteski]

The track warrant "script", which I have heard countless times in my life in and out of the industry, on wire and radio, has bothered me from the beginning as pointless rote. After the first couple of dozen times a crewman has "sung" the recitative, the ceremonial exchange is ingrained, and the "...all switches lined and locked..." statement is mindless patter. You can just tell in the tone of the crewman's voice it's a "let's get this over with", the faster the better.

IOW, the exchange has very high risk of not reflecting reality because it's, again, a required memorized script executed hundreds of times whose importance has been lost. Sort of like a Hail Mary.

Are you saying that you suspect that both crewmen rattle off that "mindless script" while sitting in the loco's cab (without actually verifying the switch position)? That would be really negligent.  I sure hope that even if the bored crewman is mindlessly rattling off the script, he would have at least checked whether the switch properly lined up.  What exactly would you prefer? A casual conversation between the dispatched and the conductor?    Hey Mike, how are the kids and the ol' battleaxe? .  . .  Oh, BTW, did you lock that switch in mainline position? 

[C855B]

You're right, "conversation" can be construed as casual. Corrected to "exchange" to better reflect the formality.