PTC

[Smike]

I completely agree, Dave. The trust many place in totally automated systems is much misplaced.

Doug

You guys ever fly in a plane recently ?    I forget the % but something like 80-90% of the landings are now all done via auto pilot.

[peteski]

You guys ever fly in a plane recently ?    I forget the % but something like 80-90% of the landings are now all done via auto pilot.

Yeah, but there is a human pilot and co-pilot (hopefully) paying attention and ready to take over controls the first sign of trouble.  But I also realize that more often than not, human error (or inattention) is the cause of accidents. T think that human operators and automated systems should coexist for maximum safety.

Speaking of automation, I'm worried that all the safety features slowly being added to cars (like line departure warnings or automatic braking) will actually make drivers more inattentive. We already have people doing everything but concentrating on driving (texting, reading, eating, doing makeup, etc.).   Wit all these features added, those type of drivers will be even less attentive while driving (because the car will take care of them automatically).  To me, either make the car fully manual (revert to the cars of yesteryear), or make it fully automatic so the inattentive drivers can finally not worry about actually having to drive and pay attention to the road around them.

[Iain]

All software is crap.

[C855B]

All software is crap.

Truth. The problem with software making formerly human-based decisions about real stuff in the real world is the 0.001% exception conditions that result in outright disaster. I recall a software design meeting (actually, a finger-pointing session after something went south) about 35 years ago where some manager actually said, "We need a list of all unanticipated problems." I kid you not. And he was serious. Pointy-haired boss sort of stuff.

I say "real stuff in the real world" because we are accustomed to software errors all around us (BSOD, anyone?) that frustrate us immensely but almost never put somebody into harm's way. Normally, control software when properly coded will go into a "most safe" mode in unexpected situations, which of course will be stopping the train. However, when there are so many highly-complex elements involved - real-time video recognition, for example - determination of "something is wrong!" becomes incredibly difficult.

I'm so glad I'm out of the business now.

[Ed Kapuscinski]

Speaking of automation, I'm worried that all the safety features slowly being added to cars (like line departure warnings or automatic braking) will actually make drivers more inattentive. We already have people doing everything but concentrating on driving (texting, reading, eating, doing makeup, etc.).   Wit all these features added, those type of drivers will be even less attentive while driving (because the car will take care of them automatically).  To me, either make the car fully manual (revert to the cars of yesteryear), or make it fully automatic so the inattentive drivers can finally not worry about actually having to drive and pay attention to the road around them.

That reminds me of this line of thinking:
http://io9.com/5751216/would-putting-a-spike-in-the-middle-of-your-steering-wheel-make-you-safer

[jagged ben]

... I recall a software design meeting (actually, a finger-pointing session after something went south) about 35 years ago where some manager actually said, "We need a list of all unanticipated problems." I kid you not. And he was serious. Pointy-haired boss sort of stuff.

LOL   
That made my day.

[Specter3]

Lets not forget the how many accidents now with Airbus aircraft and their software Law modes being a major factor, including the Air France tragedy off of Brazil. And this does nothing to address that anything run by a computer with network access can be hacked. Terrorism is not just suicide bombers. Hack an automated Oil train and run it into the train in front of it at high speed in thr middle of a city.

[peteski]

Lets not forget the how many accidents now with Airbus aircraft and their software Law modes being a major factor, including the Air France tragedy off of Brazil. And this does nothing to address that anything run by a computer with network access can be hacked. Terrorism is not just suicide bombers. Hack an automated Oil train and run it into the train in front of it at high speed in thr middle of a city.

Funny that you mentioned an oil train burning in a middle of a city. This situation already occurred but it appears that it was due to human negligence and also mistakes made by well-meaning fireman.  Not by automation.

I'm not for full automation either, especially since the code which controls the automated equipment is written by or approved/implemented by humans.  As it has been said: all code sucks (the more complex the code gets, the more imperfect it becomes).

[Spades]

You guys ever fly in a plane recently ?    I forget the % but something like 80-90% of the landings are now all done via auto pilot.

Um .. no.  Yes there are Cat III systems but their number is limited.  Automation has increased and yes the coupled approach is a great assist, but the pilot still lands the aircraft.

G

[Spades]

Thread drift.  Was discussing this with some Airbus pilots, I was curious why they couldn't see AOA inputs?  If I recall correctly the the pilot couldn't see the AOA data.  That all changed with the AF crash.  Boeing does it too.  Accident, incident and tombstone technology advances are made.

G

Lets not forget the how many accidents now with Airbus aircraft and their software Law modes being a major factor, including the Air France tragedy off of Brazil.

[Rich_S]

Normally, control software when properly coded will go into a "most safe" mode in unexpected situations, which of course will be stopping the train.

Mike, This is already true with GE and EMD software that controls the locomotive and diesel engine. All newer locomotives are fly by wire, everything from the throttle to the air brakes is controlled by a computer. If the EM2000 on a EMD 70 series sensor is reading out of range, the software will determine the best course of action, which most times is going to idle or prohibiting engine from starting. The same thing applies to Distributed Power, if the DP units lose the radio communication for too long a period of time, they will go to idle.

I have not heard yet what the time out is between the TMC on the locomotive and the main computer network, but you are correct the safest scenario is always stop, and stop everything else on the same line.

   

[Bob Bufkin]

USN F/A18 aircraft all take off from aircraft carriers without the pilot touching the controls.  The pilot takes over after launch.

[Spades]

Last thread drift, I promise

Yes the the " towel racks " of the F-18.  It where you put your hands for launch. My cousin (T-2, TA-4, F-4 prior) kept his on the stick and throttle on his first F-18 launch, Why? It what worked on the last 200 launches and he forgot.  But he adjusted. 
No more airplane talk.

USN F/A18 aircraft all take off from aircraft carriers without the pilot touching the controls.  The pilot takes over after launch.

[GaryHinshaw]

An op-ed plea in today's New York Times from the chairpersons of Dow Chemical and BNSF.

[reinhardtjh]

The Senate approved a transportation bill today (Oct 28th, 2015) with a delay for PTC until Jan 1st, 2019. It just needs Presidential approval.

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-metra-ptc-extension-met-20151028-story.html